We study the synchronous 8th-order differential attack on the 128-bit block cipher HyRAL proposed by Hirata of Laurel Intelligent Systems in 2010. HyRAL supports 128, 192, 256 bits of secret keys. We found the new synchronous 8th-order differential characteristics of HyRAL in the 8th round of data-mixing part. Exploiting the characteristics we show that 12 rounds of HyRAL can be attacked with 2 12.9 blocks of chosen plain text and 2 233.7 times of data encryption. We have reduced data complexity to 1/2 8 and reduced computational complexity to 1/2 13 compared to the conventional attack. 
I. INTRODUCTION
HyRAL is a 128-bit block cipher proposed by Hirata of Laurel Intelligent Systems in 2010 [1] . It supports 128, 192, and 256 bits of secret keys. HyRAL consists of bytewise swaps, nonlinear layers, and linear layers. It has been reported that a data-mixing function of HyRAL is secure against differential attacks and linear attacks [2] , [3] . It has been also reported that 12 rounds of HyRAL out of 32 rounds can be attacked with the 16th-order differential characteristics, 2 20.9 blocks of chosen plain text and 2 246.7 times of data encryption [4] .
In this article, we show the new synchronous 8th-order differential characteristics of HyRAL in the 8th round we found. By exploiting the characteristics we show that 12 rounds of HyRAL can be attacked with 2 12.9 blocks of chosen plain text and 2 233.7 times of data encryption. We have reduced data complexity to 1/2 8 and reduced computational complexity to 1/2 13 compared to the conventional attack [4] . In Section II we describe the data-mixing function of HyRAL and its components. In Section III we generally describe higher-order differential [5] and its attack equation. In Section IV we show the  Manuscript received April 15, 2013; revised July 17, 2013. new synchronous 8th-order differential characteristics of HyRAL in the 8th round, and show that 12 rounds of HyRAL can be attacked by exploiting the characteristics we found with low complexities. In Section V we conclude our article. Fig. 1 shows data-mixing functions of HyRAL for a 128-bit key (a) and for a 192-bit or 256-bit key (b). They consist of 128-bit input/output (I/O) functions, G 1 , G 2 , F 1 , and F 2 . RK i (i = 1, 2, , 9) and IK i (i = 1, 2, , 6) are 128-bit sub keys. The symbol "" indicates an XOR operation. X (0) denotes a 128-bit plain text. X (24) in (a) and X (32) in (b) denote 128-bit cipher texts. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show G 1 , G 2 , F 1 , and F 2 where X (i) = X 1 (i) || X 2 (i) || X 3 (i) || X 4 (i) and IK i = IK i0 || IK i1 || IK i2 || IK i3 . X j (i) (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) and IK ij (j = 0, 1, 2, 3) are 32-bit data. The symbol "||" denotes a concatenation of two data. G i and F i (i = 1, 2) consist of 4 iteration rounds, which consists of XOR and f i with 32-bit I/O (i = 1, 2, , 8). Fig. 4 shows f i , which consists of the byte-wise swap, S, P, and XOR. The symbol "0x" represents that its following value is hexadecimal. Assuming the I/O of the swap as 32-bit vectors x and (1) x j (j = 0, 1, 2, 3) is an 8-bit data. S denotes the S-box with 8-bit I/O, which is a bijective nonlinear function. P is a 4  4 non-singular matrix given by 
II. DATA-MIXING FUNCTION OF HYRAL
The multiplications of a matrix and a vector are performed in GF(2 8 ) defined by the characteristic polynomial z 8 + z 4 + z 3 + z + 1. f i can be equivalently modified as shown in Fig. 5 where the number in a box represents multiplication and y ij (i, j = 0, 1, 2, 3) represents an 8-bit intermediate data of f i . 
III. HIGHER-ORDER DIFFERENTIAL
In this section, we describe the definition of higherorder differential and some of its properties related to this article [5] , and we describe an attack equation using these properties. Fig. 6 shows a block diagram of an encryption process. E 1 and E 2 represent components of an encryption process.
K 1  GF(2) p and K 2  GF(2) q represent p bits and q bits of the extended keys used in E 1 and E 2 , respectively. P = (p 1 , p 2 , , p n ) and P  GF(2) n represent n bits of input plain text and input difference, respectively. H  GF(2) m represents m bits of the output of E 1 . C(P  P)  GF(2)  represents  bits of the output cipher text corresponding to (P  P). We assume V (i) as an ithorder subspace of GF(2) n consisting of linear independent i vectors in GF(2) n (i  n), and call it an input differential. The ithorder differential of E 1 (P; K 1 ) with respect to V (i) is defined by  (i) E 1 (P; K 1 ) as follows
  denotes summation of XOR. If the algebraic degree of E 1 (P; K 1 ) with respect to P is N ( n), the (N+1)thorder differential of E 1 (P; K 1 ) becomes zero regardless of P and K 1 as follow 0 ) ; (
Moreover, if the Boolean polynomial of E 1 (P; K 1 ) does not include the jth-order term as   
Since E 1 (P; K 1 ) = E 2 -1 (C(P); K 2 ), which is the inverse function of E 2 , (4) and (5) Equations (6) and (7) are always correct if K 2 is correct, while they are stochastically correct if K 2 is incorrect. This is why attacker can estimate K 2 and check the correctness of K 2 by (6) or (7). The incorrect K 2 can be eliminated by solving some sets of the equation (6) or (7) whose plain texts P are different from each other. Actually, we have to solve at least q/m different sets of (6) or (7). Such attack using (6) or (7) is called a higherorder differential attack. Equation (6) or (7) is called an attack equation.
IV. THE SYNCHRONOUS 8TH-ORDER DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HYRAL AND ITS ATTACK EQUATION
In this section, we describe the new synchronous 8thorder differential characteristics of HyRAL we found, and describe the attack equation exploiting the characteristics. At the end we estimate the number of chosen plain texts and the number of encryption operations required to identify the sub keys. Fig. 7 shows the new synchronous 8th-order differential path of HyRAL where f 7 in the 8th round is equivalently modified. Note that RK i = RK i0 || RK i1 || RK i2 || RK i3 where RK ij (j = 0, 1, 2, 3) is a 32-bit sub key. P -1 is the inverse matrix of P. C is the constant addition corresponding to Fig. 4 . We put the 8th-order differential into the upper 8 bits of X 3 (0) shown as "A" in Fig. 7 . Namely, all 2 8 kinds of data from 0x00 to 0xff are put into the upper 8 bits of X 3 (0) . At this time the same difference as the upper 8 bits of X 3 (0) is put into the upper 8 bits of X 4 (0) shown as "S" in Fig. 7 , which we call "synchronous." The remaining 14 bytes shown as "C" in Fig. 7 are set to take arbitrary constants. In this case, we found that the 8th-order differentials of 32-bit A and 32bit B in the 8th round take the same value regardless of a plain text and the sub keys in the previous rounds. By exploiting the characteristics we can derive the following attack equation as (3) (8) ) ( denotes the upper ith byte of data x. C denotes the constant addition in Fig. 7 . X (12) (X (0)  X (0) ) denotes the cipher text corresponding to the input plain text X (0) X (0) . We can identify total 232-bit sub keys, RK' 30 , 2 B ' 13 ) (IK , RK 42 , IK' 21 , RK 41 , IK' 22 , RK 40 , and IK' 23 by solving these attack equations by an exhaustive search. Because (8) is 8 sets (bits) of system of Boolean equations, it is satisfied with probability 2 -8 even if the estimated sub keys are false. There are 2 232 candidates of sub keys since its total bit size is 232. Therefore we need to solve 30 (= (232/8)+1) sets of (8) with different X (0) in order to identify the true sub key where the probability that a false sub key survives is 2 -8 (= (2 -8 ) 30  2 232 ). Because we have to compute the 8th-order differential to prepare one set of (8), the number of chosen plain texts to prepare 30 different sets of (8) is given by D as follows: Next we study the number of times of data encryptions required to solve 30 different sets of (8). If we solve the first set of (8) for all 2 232 candidates of sub keys, the number of candidates is reduced to 2 224 (= 2 232  2 -8 ). And then we solve the second set of (8) for the remaining 2 224 candidates, its number is reduced to 2 216 (= 2 224  2 -8 ). By solving 30 different sets of (8), the last remaining key will be the true key. 2 8 times of S-box operation at f 7 in the 8th round is carried out to check the correctness of one candidate sub key. Because 12 rounds of data-mixing part include 80 S-boxes, the total number of   operations in (8) times 1/80 corresponds to the total number (T) of times of the data encryptions required for this attack as follows: V. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the new synchronous 8th-order differential attack on 12 rounds of HyRAL as part of security evaluation. We found the new synchronous 8thorder differential characteristics at the 8th round of HyRAL. We equivalently modified f 7 at the 8th round and derived the attack equations. As a result, we showed that 12 rounds of HyRAL can be attacked with 2 12.9 blocks of chosen plain text and 2 233.7 times of the data encryption by exploiting the new synchronous 8th-order differential characteristics we found. However fullrounds of HyRAL is secure against our attack because the number of rounds is actually 32.
